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SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*
HALAW M. CAMOUN**

A T this

time when we have under consideration a proposal for
simplification of procedure in order to facilitate the trial or
hearing of civil cases,' it may be significant to some degree that no
similar proposal has been made in relation to the procedural machinery for trial of criminal cases.
For the vast majority of our number, simplification of civil
procedure would affect only a portion of our work.2
It may be that reform of civil procedure enlists the greater degree
of attention because so much thereof is promoted and fostered by
the bar organizations, many of whose most active members devote
themselves exclusively to matters civil in nature.
I am not prepared to chart a well-defined course for reform
of criminal procedure. Nevertheless, it may very well be that we
as a profession, particularly we as members of the judiciary, would
be remiss if we should fail to make any exploration whatsoever
* Address delivered at the twenty-first annual meeting of the West Virginia
Judicial Association at Morgantown, West Virginia, October 10-11, 1957.
* Judge of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit of West Virginia.
Prior to the Judicial Association's meeting, the West Virginia State Bar
had completed its poll of attorneys on the question of adoption of Rules of Civil
Procedure for West Virginia, patterned largely on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The vote of the attorneys was on a ratio of approximately five to
one in favor of adoption of the Rules. Adoption and promulgation of the Rules
are within the province of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
2 Most of the state courts exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction.
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 12.
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of the possibility of keeping reforms in the one branch of jurisdiction
abreast of the reforms in the other.3
In an exploration of such possibility, three avenues readily suggest themselves: (a) legislation; (b) constitutional revision; and
(c) judicial construction.
LEGISLATION

Perhaps it was at least partially because of a study and recommendation made by our group that the legislature in 1955 amended
West Virginia Code, 62-3-6, to dispense with the necessity of keeping a jury together except in relation to capital offenses. 4 I have
no doubt that we have all found this to be a salutary statutory
revision, saving annoyance to the court, unnecessary inconvenience
to jurors, and, at the same time, bringing about a very considerable
saving to the taxpayer; and all this without interfering with the
administration of justice either from the standpoint of the accused
or of the state.
I mention this one matter because it may serve as one isolated,
comparatively minor example of what might perhaps be done for
improvement of criminal procedure if we will but give the subject
some study and seek to arrive at some concerted action.
Code, 62-3-3, provides for the only exception to the rule of
four strikes to each side in a jury case.5 It provides that in a felony
case the defense shall have six strikes and the accused two. This
has been criticized upon many occasions and many suggestions
have been made to make the rule uniform in all types of cases.
There is no sound reason for the distinction. No doubt all of us
who preside over trials of felony cases have noted that the unfortunate result is that the six best, most competent jurors are generally struck by the defense.
Code, 62-3-2, provides that "A person indicted for felony shall
be personally present during the trial therefor." It is held that the
trial commences with the arraignment and plea and continues until
final judgment. It is held further that the accused must be present
at every step of the trial.
3 By order of December 26, 1944 the Supreme Court of the United States
had adopted Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States.
4 W. Va. Acts 1955, c. 98.
5 See W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 6, § 12 (Michie 1955).
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In the case of State v. Martin,6 it is stated:
...The purpose of the statute is to preserve inviolate for
an accused person his right and privilege of seeing and hearing
what transpires at his trial...
That is, the statute is held to embody a statement of a "right and
privilege" of the accused. The Martin case resulted in a reversal
of the conviction and sentence in the trial court because of defendants brief and inconsequential absence. In the opinion nine previous decisions are cited which resulted in similar reversals.
We would all agree that the defendant should have the right
to be present throughout his trial. But it is a right and privilege
which defendant should have the right to waive to some extent,
and the statute should so provide. If he elects to be absent during
some small portion of the trial at which he is represented by his
counsel, there should be no reversal in the absence of a showing
of prejudice. The rule is entirely statutory, though perhaps declaratory of the common law. No doubt proper language could be found
for a relaxation of the rule without destroying any basic rights of
the accused. 7
Code, 52-2-4, provides that fifteen grand jurors shall constitute
a quorum. But, as I construe the statute, and as I understond it is
generally construed by the judges, vacancies can not be filled until
court convenes and it is determined whether or not at least fifteen
are in attendance. And this is true even though we may know in
advance that we will not have a quorum, because of death, removal
from the jurisdiction, or for other cause. Therefore, a delay is often
occasioned while we summon special jury commissioners and fill the
vacancies.
This, I feel, could be remedied either by making specific provision for filling such vacancies before the day the grand jury is
summoned to convene; or by providing that a number less than
fifteen shall constitute a quorum.
In the state of Virginia it is provided that a grand jury shall
be composed of not less than five nor more than seven persons, at
least four of whom shall concur before there may be an indictment.8
6 120 W. Va. 229, 231, 197 S.E. 727, 728 (1938), italics supplied. See
also LEE, THE CnvmmAL TALL nN ma VImGmrG s 90 (2d ed. 1940).
7See comment on State v. Martin and other West Virginia cases in
45 W. VA. L.Q. 82 (1938). See also 28 C.J.S. § 975 (1942).
8 See VA. CODE §§ 19-125, 19-132 (Michie 1950).
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Perhaps a number considerably less than fifteen or sixteen would
be adequate in any event.
Our only provision for amendment of an indictment is found
in Code, 62-2-10. It relates only to a misnomer of the accused. The
state of Virginia makes far more liberal provisions for amendment
of indictments, so long as the amendment "does not change the
nature of the offense." 9 Perhaps many perplexing questions, much
delay or even grave miscarriages of justice might be avoided without sacrificing basic rights of the accused if proper consideration
were given to statutory revision in this respect.
CoNsrrrTXONAL FiovIsioNs

In the light of the current measures looking toward a revision
of our state constitution, it might be appropriate for the legal profession to appraise that document with a view of determining
whether or not by proper revision the trial of criminal cases may
be facilitated without at the same time doing violence to basic
rights of accused persons.
In this connection the provision of our state constitution which
I have heard referred to most often is article III, section 4 which
provides:
"... No person shall be held to answer for treason, felony

or other crime, not cognizable by a justice, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury... "
In other words, it is provided that a felony charge can not be
tried, and the accused can not plead either guilty or not guilty,
"unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury." So often we
encounter persons accused of felony who want to plead forthwith,
but they must await the convening of a grand jury. The accused
may be in jail meantime. It may be his intention to plead guilty,
and it may be the intention of the court to release him upon probation. Were it not for this constitutional provision, there may be
occasions when a grand jury may be dispensed with completely,
particularly in the less populous counties.
This provision has been eliminated from the constitution of
the state of Virginia. A statute of that state provides for trial upon
presentment or indictment by a grand jury; and proceeds as follows:
9id.§§ 19-149, 19-150 and 19-151.
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".. . unless such person, by writing signed by such person
before the court having jurisdiction to try such felony, or
before the judge of such court in vacation, shall have waived
such indictment or presentment, in which event he may be
tried on a warrant or information. ... "10
In this respect I feel that our criminal procedure could be
simplified and improved if proper provision were made for such
waiver and for trial upon an information.
Without recommendation I here point out that the constitution
of the state of Virginia provides for a jury of fewer than twelve in
all cases except upon felony charges; and also that one accused
of a felony may waive a jury trial and submit his case for trial
before the court in lieu of a jury."
Without going into detail, I would like to suggest a revision of
the constitution of this state to limit the power of the governor
indiscriminately and capriciously "to grant reprieves and pardons
after conviction."' 2 At least there might be provision for a previous
study and investigation of the case, by the attorney general, by
the West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole or in some other
manner. An experience I had in this connection during the waning
hours of a governor's term of office was most unfortunate.
In my own personal, humble judgment, the constitutional provision which is most distorted and which causes the most frequent
miscarriages of justice without affecting in substance the basic
rights of the accused is the simple provision that "the accused shall
be fully and plainly informed of the character and cause of the
accusation."13
I believe that I comprehend and appreciate reasonably the
historical background for this constitutional provision, as well as
the evil of a much earlier day it was designed to correct and avoid.
I have not the slightest quarrel with the proposition that an accused
individual should not be haled into court for trial upon a criminal
charge without adequate previous knowledge and information as
to the essential nature of the charge.
But I do sincerely feel that technical rules upon which courts
are required to operate in this later period have to an unnecessary
'id. § 19-186.
111d. §§ 19-166, 19-167 and 19-168, and annotations thereto. See also
Annotation, 51 A.L.R.2d 1846 (1957).
12W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
18 Id. art. III, § 14.
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and regrettable degree abandoned substance in the pursuit of
empty form.
How often have we experienced counsel for an accused coming
before the court by demurrer and asserting for instance: "May it
please the court, my client is indicted for drunken driving, but the
indictment does not advise him of the nature and cause of the
accusation." The inconsistency in this respect is analogous to that
of the proverbial verdict of the jury: 'we, the jury, find the man
who stole the horse not guilty."
As a matter of actuality, we find that the accused himself is
fully advised. If he needs further information, he may require a
bill of particulars. 14 But the difficulty is rather that the attorney
himself is not advised in the esoteric language known and spoken
only by members of the legal profession. I shall refer further to
this question in the subsequent portion of these remarks.
JuDicrAL CoNRuCrioN

That there is a fairly wide range of permissible flexibility in
judicial pronouncement by appellate courts is so clear that the
proposition need not be belabored. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States relative to segregation is a case
in point.15

The Supreme Court of Appeals of this state not infrequently
exercises this right. For instance, in the recent case of State v.
Bragg,16 by a three-two decision the court changed a procedural
principle in a criminal case by the specific disavowal of numerous
previous decisions.
This field of permissive flexibility, in my judgment, clothes our
profession with a peculiar facility for keeping procedure for trial
of criminal cases abreast of the age in which a man-made satellite
encircles the globe at the rate of 18,000 miles per hour.
In the case of Lovings v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,17 Judge McWhorter
said, "'It is better to be right than to be consistent with the errors
14 W. VA. CoD. c. 56, art. 4, § 19 (Michie 1950). The statute applies to
criminal and civil cases. State v. Lewis, 69 W. Va. 472 72 S.E. 475 (1911),
and State v. Jarrett, 119 W. Va. 432, 194 S.E. 1 (19373.
15 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954).
16 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955).
1747 NV. Va. 582, 590, 35 S.E. 962, 965 (1900).
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of a hundred years.'" In Town of Weston v. Ralston,18 Judge Brannon said, "No legal principle is ever settled until it is settled right"
While our opportunity and responsibility as a profession are
in this respect great, I seriously doubt that we keep apace with
the public thinking or with the remedial tendency of our legislative
branch.
For instance, as late as the year 1930, in the case of State v.
Robison,'9 it was held that an indictment was fatally defective to
the extent that it merely alleged the theft of $3,500.00. It was held
to be a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused in the
absence of an allegation of the number, kind, and denominations
of the several pieces of money, and an allegation disclosing whether
gold, silver or copper. Judge Hatcher, in his dissenting opinion,
quotes Justice Holmes as follows:
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, "2and
the rule simply persists from
0
blind imitation of the past.
Under this and similar decisions, it was sufficient in the alternative to allege that the denominations and kind of the money were
to the grand jurors unknown. How enlightening it would have
been to the accused to have had a new and reformed indictment
advising him that the nature and denominations of the money were
"to the grand jurors unknown"
The point I make here is that we left it to the legislative branch
to relieve us from that ridiculous situation which survived from
ancient times. It can not be replied that the courts were lacking in
constitutional authority to make the change; because, if an indictment omitting such detailed description of the money is violative
of the constitutional rights of the accused, then it follows that the
remedial statute itself is unconstitutional.
The legislative branch has charted a course for us in setting
out in detail what defects shall not invalidate an indictment.2 1 The
18 48

W. Va. 170, 180, 36 S.E. 446, 450 (1900).

19 109 W. Va. 561, 155 S.E. 649 (1930).

20 Id. at 565, 155 S.E. at 650. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hv.
L. Rzv. 457, 468-69 (1897).
21W. VA. CODE c. 62, art. 2, § 10 (Michie 1955).
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legislative branch also sets forth in detail "defects cured by verdict,"
by use of the following rather comprehensive language:
"Judgment in any criminal case, after verdict, shall not
be arrested or reversed upon any exception to the indictment
or other accusation, if the offense be charged therein with
sufficient certainty for judgment to
2 2 be given thereon, according to the very right of the case."
23
In the more recent case of State ex rel. Cain v. Skeen, it
appeared that the accused had been indicted in the circuit court
of Wirt County upon a charge of statutory rape, and, upon his plea
of guilty, he was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary. Upon
direct proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus, it was held (although
the opinion states that it is contrary to the weight of authority)
that the indictment was void and a nullity, and consequently his plea
and sentence were void and a nullity, because the indictment to
which he entered his plea of guilty failed to allege his age. How
enlightening it would have been to appraise the accused of his
age! How beneficial to him in making his defense, or entering his
pleal How the "character and cause of the accusation" would have
been elucidated therebyl
Subsequently in one of the counties of my own circuit we had
before us a man we considered away from home until he was
securely lodged in the penitentiary. There was a similar disposition
of his case in my court and, by like procedure, the doors of the
penitentiary were opened for his release. And all this, because,
24
forsooth, we failed to apprise the defendant of his age.

In the case of State v. Musgrave, in which the accused was
convicted of murder here in Monongalia County and sentenced
to life imprisonment and in which there was a reversal, Judge
Brannon, in his dissent, states:
".... If we could say there was any misstep in a matter of

law in this long trial, it is one of very immaterial character,
weighing not a feather in the trial, utterly inadequate to justify
the reversal of a long, laborous trial bearing to us the face of
having been full, patient and fair. The scope of harmless error
is, in these days widening. Courts do not nowadays, even in
grave trials, reverse such trials for trivial errors, evidently not
affecting them; so light, and plainly playing so unimportant a
part, as not to be appreciably influential or prejudicial. In days
22 Id. c. 62, art. 2, § 11.

23
137 W. Va. 806, 74 S.E.2d 413 (1953).
24
State v. Coiner, 98 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1957).
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gone by, technicalities and rigid procedure sprang up and were
enforced to defend accused parties against the demand of monarchic power for conviction, and they then answered, 'Good
purpose;' but in this country there is not the same need of
them, as the danger now is that the guilty will go free, and
something is necessary to protect the public against crime."2 5
In his dissenting opinion in the case of State v. Stollings, Judge
Fox points out how often and how frequently, by divided courts,
we have switched our position on the question of disjunctive pleading in indictments, and refers to the majority opinion as follows:
".... Eloquent, even lyrical, phrases are used to picture
our legal rights, whether they be inherent under our system
of government, or assured by the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. With that position, and the spirit which prompts it,
I do not disagree. But I would like to hear some voice raised
in behalf of the law-abiding people of the State, to whom
crime is abhorrent, and who expect law-enforcement agencies
of the State, in all its subdivisions and departments, to protect
them. I would like to hear some one speak for the conscientious
and honest law enforcement officers who, in their line of duty,
are hampered and impeded in their work by unreasonable rules
to which men resort when accused of crime, and which rules
are, in my opinion, too often recognized by the courts. I would
give every accused person a fair trial. He is entitled to that
and no more. He is not entitled to be coddled, nor, if gulity,
to have freedom awarded to him by a court on some excuse
be related to the realities of the situation prewhich cannot
6
sented."2
We give lip service in this state to a recognition of the doctrine
of harmless error in criminal cases. But it seems to me that such
rule is applied with baseless liberality in favor of the accused.
Professor Wigmore, in the second edition of his well known
work on Evidence, in dealing with the doctrine of harmless error
and related questions, has much to say, a small portion of which
is as follows:
"... the maudlin sentimentality of judges in criminal cases
must cease. Reverence for the Constitution is one thing, and
a respect for substantial fairness of procedure is commendable.
But the exultation of technicalities of every sort merely because
they are raised on behalf of an accused person is a different
and reprehensible thing. All the sentiment is thrown to weight
the scales for the criminal-that is, not for the mere accused,
25 43 W. Va. 672, 710, 28 S.E. 813, 828 (1897).

26128 W. Va. 483, 494, 37 S.E.2d 98, 102-3 (1946).
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who may be assumed innocent, but for the man who upon
the record plainly appears to be the villain that the jury have
pronounced him to be. We have long since passed the period
(as a modem judge has pointed out) 'when it is possible to
punish an innocent man; we are now struggling with the problem whether it is any longer possible to punish the guilty.' The
dignity, the truth, and the lofty inspiration of great constitutional principles are frittered away and degraded. While on
the one hand certain fundamental ideals of political liberty
have come to be lightly questioned as impracticable or cynically ignored as obsolete, on the other hand the constitutional
safeguards of procedure and evidence are invoked with such
fatuous philanthropy and such misplaced magnanimity that
their respect is lowered and their true purposes are defeated.
I do not understand,' protested a great judicial interpreter of
the organic law, 'that the Constitution is an instrument to
play fast and loose with in criminal cases, any more than in any
other; or that it is the business of Courts to be astute in the
discovery of technical difficulties in the punishment of parties
for their criminal conduct.' Yet they seem to make it their
business. A false sentiment misapplies their energies. This
they must unlearn. The epoch of governmental oppression has
passed away; the epoch of individualistic anarchy has taken its
place. They must learn the lesson of transferring the emphasis
of their sympathies,-a lesson more than once read to them
by
27
the voices of their own fellow-members of the judiciary."
I realize, of course, that we are a government of law, and not
of men. That being so, no doubt it is inevitable that, in the application of such laws, there shall always be some unfortunate results
which do not accord with good judgment, common sense and
justice. But I do feel that, whenever or wherever the law leads
us to an unjust or ridiculous result, we should not accept it with
complete resignation and complacency as something unavoidable.
Rather every such unfortunate result should be regarded by our
profession as a challenge to an endeavor to correct and refine the
machinery under which our criminal courts must operate in the
discharge of our solemn responsibility to the public.
In any event, may we never see the dawning of the day when
we, as lawyers and as judges shall become slaves to the abstract
rules under which we operate to the extent that we shall fail to
appreciate that our job is to deal with human beings and their
28
difficulties, and with actual, real, concrete situations.
271 WIGmoHE, EvIDENCE 210 (2d ed. 1923). See also 1 WcMOE,
EViDENcE
§ 21 (3d ed. 1940).
28
See CAlwozo, THE NATuRm OF TnE JUDIcIAL PaocEss 142 et seq.

(1921).
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